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Abstract: In this paper, we discuss the government’s reward and penalty mechanism in the presence of 
asymmetric information and carbon emission constraint when downstream retailers compete in a reverse supply 
chain network. Considering five game models which are different in terms of the coordination structure of the 
reverse supply chain network and power structure of the reward-penalty mechanism: (1) the reverse supply 
chain network centralized decision-making model; (2) the reverse supply chain network centralized decision-
making model with carbon emission constraint; (3) the retailers’ competition reverse supply chain network 
decentralized  decision-making model; (4) the retailers’ competition reverse supply chain network decentralized  
decision-making model with carbon emission constraint; and (5) the retailers’ competition reverse supply chain 
network decentralized  decision-making model with  carbon emission constraint  and  the government’s reward-
penalty mechanism. Building the participation - incentive contract under each model use the principal-agent 
theory, and solving the model use the Lagrange multiplier method. We can get the following conclusion: (1) 
when the government implements the reward-penalty mechanism for carbon emission and recycling 
simultaneously, the recycling rate as well as the buy-back price offered by the manufacturer are higher than 
those when the government conducts reward-penalty mechanism exclusively for carbon emission;  (2) when the 
government implements carbon emission constraint，both retailers’ selling prices of the new product are  higher 
than  those when no carbon emission constraint is forced; (3), there is no certain relationship between the two 
retailers’ selling prices of the new product when the government implements the reward-penalty mechanism 
only for carbon emission and when it implements the mechanism for carbon emission as well as recycling; (4) 
Regardless of the retailer's fixed cost is high or low, when the government implement reward-penalty 
mechanism for carbon emission, the retailer's buy-back price is affected by the carbon emission in the 
manufacturer; (5) When it satisfy certain some conditions, the buy-back price of the retailers’ competition 
reverse supply chain decentralized  decision-making model with  carbon emission constraint  and  the 
government’s reward-penalty mechanism can larger than that of the retailers’ competition reverse supply chain 
decentralized  decision-making model with carbon emission constraint.  
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mechanism; stackelberg game 
 
 1 Introduction 
        With the development of the economy and society, more and more people pay much attention to the 
environmental protection and ecological balance problem. There are more than 700 kinds of chemical 
composition in the waste electrical and electronic products (WEEE), most of them are harmful for people, on the 
other hand, the WEEE can bring much more economic value. Thus, the government makes much more policies 
and regulations so that it can guide the manufacturer or the retailer to recycle and reuse the WEEE. Many 
measures reflect the ideas of the extended production responsibility, such as the recycling of waste product, the 
standardization of recycling and manufacturing, and the batch of production. In 2003, the European Union 
publishes the regulation about recycling the WEEE products so that it effectively promotes the recycling of the 
WEEE products, and controls the environment problem.  
        In China, some regulations about the WEEE products recycling begin to implement. In addition, in order to 
implementing the extended production responsibility, manufacturer should consider the environmental problem 
in the processing of design, production and sale. The government policy plays an important role in the WEEE 
products collection. Through extend production responsibility law, the government incentivizes the 
manufacturer or the retailer to produce the environmentally friendly product and recycles the WEEE products at 
the end of the product life. In Europe, producers take responsibility for recycling the used vehicles, packaging 
and other WEEE products. Until now, many US states have passed law mandating state wide e-waste recycling.  
         From above analysis, we find that some regulations in European Union stress penalty, on the other hand, 
the regulation in china focuses on subsidy and penalty. We have not found the mechanism that puts together 
reward with penalty. In this paper, the reward and penalty mechanism is considered. With asymmetric 
information and retail-level competition in the presence of carbon emission constraints, we mainly identify the 
best design parameters for the reward and penalty mechanism so that it promotes the retailer to collecting more 
WEEE products.  
        As is known to us, the traditional closed-loop supply chain includes one supplier, one manufacturer, one 
retailer and one recycler. Moreover, the manufacturer is the channel leader in the closed-loop supply chain, 
while, the retailer is the channel follower. With the development of economy and society, more and more firms 
participate in the closed-loop supply chain. Thus, the closed-loop supply chain becomes the closed-loop supply 
chain network which includes multi-supplier, multi-manufacturer and multi-retailer. There is competition 
relationship between different firms; we think that this competition relationship has advantage to promoting the 
reuse and recovery of the WEEE products. Based on above theory and practice of the closed-loop supply chain 
network, with the reward and penalty mechanism and the asymmetric information, we consider five game 
models which are different in terms of the coordination structure of the reverse supply chain network and power 
structure of the reward-penalty mechanism: (1) the reverse supply chain network centralized decision-making 
model; (2) the reverse supply chain network centralized decision-making model with carbon emission constraint; 
(3) the retailers’ competition reverse supply chain network decentralized  decision-making model; (4) the 
retailers’ competition reverse supply chain network decentralized  decision-making model with carbon emission 
constraint; and (5) the retailers’ competition reverse supply chain network decentralized  decision-making model 
with  carbon emission constraint  and  the government’s reward-penalty mechanism. We discuss the following 
questions: 
        (1) With the asymmetric information, how does the participate-incentive contract design between the 
manufacturer and the retailer so that it promotes the retailer to recycling more WEEE products in different 
decision-making model?   
        (2) How does the reward and penalty mechanism of the government impact on the recycling rate, the sell 
price and the profit in different decision-making model? 
        This paper is different from the other closed-loop supply chain researches in the following aspects. Firstly, 
we expands the research object which includes one-manufacturer and two-retailer, moreover, there is the 
competition relationship between two retailers. Assuming that the recycling scale coefficient, the recycling rate 
and the fixed cost are the retailer one’s private information, the manufacturer should identify this private 
information by designing the participate-incentive contract.  
        Secondly, the recycling and reuse of the WEEE products can produce much more economy value; the 
government should participate in this process. We assume that the government as an individual should take part 
in the process of the recycling of the WEEE products by designing the reward and penalty mechanism. With the 
asymmetric information, we combine the reward and penalty mechanism with the closed-loop supply chain 
network and research how the reward and penalty mechanism of the government impact on the sell price and the 
profit in different decision-making model in the closed-loop supply chain network. 
       The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we present the relevant literature. The 
theory model and the relevant variables are described in section 3. Five game models which are different in 
terms of the coordination structure of the reverse supply chain network and power structure of the reward-
penalty mechanism are considered in section 4. The result in different decision-making game models can be 
compared in section 5. Numerical analysis is given in section 6. We can get some conclusions in section 7. 
2. Literature Review 
         This paper is closely related to two streams of literature: the coordination strategy with symmetric 
information when manufacturer or recycler participates in the reverse supply chain; the coordination strategy 
with symmetric information when the government participates in the reverse supply chain. We briefly review 
the two streams of related literature. 
        2.1 Coordination strategy with symmetric information when manufacturer or recycler participates 
in the reverse supply chain 
        Many scholars discuss the reverse logistics and the closed-loop supply chain. At the beginning of 1990s, 
some literatures discussed the supply chain coordination problem. For example, Monczka et al.(1998)[1] 
defined the supply chain coordination problem that it should deal with the relationship between different firms. 
Mentzer et al.(2001)[2] thought that the supply chain coordination was a union in business operation level. 
Corbett and Savaskan (2003)[3] pointed out that each member in the reverse supply chain could achieve the 
coordination of overall interests by making the contract. Wong et al.(2009)[4] researched that it could achieve 
the coordination by making the contract and improved the efficiency between the JCPenny and Wal-Mart. It 
could achieve the coordination by many kinds of measures, such as improving the quality of products (Debo et 
al.,2005[5]), competitive strategy (Majumder and Groenevelt, 2001[6]), technological innovation (Geyer et 
al. ,2007[7]). Ferrer and Swaminathan (2006, 2010)[8-9] proposed that it should make the different price 
between the new electronic product and the recycling electronic product.  
        Ferguson and Toktay (2006)[10] set the nonlinear recovery function and manufacturer could improve their 
profits by using compulsory acquisition strategy. Assuming that competition between manufacturers, based on 
the product life cycle theory, Mitra and Webster (2008)[11] analysed the price and coordination strategy in the 
reverse supply chain. From the aspect of the social responsibility, Yang Yu Xiang et al.(2011)[12]  researched 
the coordination problem in the reverse supply chain. Assuming that manufacturers sell product by using the 
network market, Zhang Gui Tao et al.(2013)[13] analysed the coordination problem under the case of damaged 
products. Luo Ding Ti et al.(2010)[14] built the decentralized supply chain consisting of one supplier and two 
retailers, assuming that they only trade one kinds of product, it could achieve the coordination in supply chain 
by using the payment incentive measure. Based on the stochastic demand function, Zhang Cui Hua et 
al.(2004)[15] built the incentive function under the rewards and punishment mechanism, under the asymmetric 
information, they built the coordination mechanism between one manufacturer and one supplier. Heese, Cattani, 
Ferrer et al.(2005)[16] investigated the impact of the recycling waste electronic product on the advantage of 
oligarch competition in the double oligarch market. Savaskan et al. (2004)[17] analysed efficiency problem in 
two different types of reverse supply chain. Guide and Teunter (2003)[18] discussed how to set up the demand 
equilibrium value of waste electronic products, and it could achieve the benefit maximization in the 
remanufacturing supply chain system. Mukhopadhyay and Setoputro (2005)[19] researched that there was the 
positive relationship between the performance of electronic products and the best recovery strategy. 
       2.2 Coordination strategy with symmetric information when the government participating in reverse 
supply chain. 
       Above literatures mainly discussed how to realize the coordination strategy with manufacturer or recycler 
participating in the reverse supply chain. The government as a separate entity, and should be involved in the 
reverse supply chain activities.  It was very important that the government promoted the recovery of the WEEE 
products by making regulations. For example, the government should take carbon tax to the manufacturer for 
reducing the carbon emission, while the government could make reward and penalty mechanism so that it could 
promote the manufacturer to improving the recovery and reuse of the WEEE products. Palmer and Walls (1999) 
[20] pointed out that the government should provide financial and policy to supporting for manufacturer, and 
encouraging manufacturer to participate in the waste product recycling and remanufacturing activity. Zhang Bao 
Yin et al. (2006)[21] pointed out that the government should implement certain reward and punishment 
measures so that the manufacturer could recycle the old product. Dai Yi Sheng et al. (2008)[24] proposed a new 
fiscal subsidy mechanism, and required the minimum purchase price in the model. Da Qing Li (2008)[23] 
pointed out that it worthy to be discussed that the government's policy could impact on recycling the waste 
product.  
      Wang Wen Bin et al.(2008)[24] discussed the impact of the reward and penalty mechanism on the 
manufacturer’s recycling activitiy. Mitra et al.(2008)[25] proposed a two-stage game model, and manufacturer 
or recycler existed competition relationship, analysed the government subsidy impact on the reverse supply 
chain. Based on above analysis, Wang Wen Bin et al.(2009)[26] compared and analysed the difference that the 
government provided reward and penalty mechanism to manufacturer and collector. Chen et al. (2009)[27] built 
an environmental regulation pricing strategy, and they concluded that the government should improve the price 
standard and it could effectively guide manufacturer to improve the recovery rate of waste product. Based on the 
government’s reward and penalty mechanism, Yan Ming et al.(2015)[28] built the WEEE products 
remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain model, and analysed the impact of the consumer's pay willingness 
(WTP) for remanufacturing product and government’s reward and penalty mechanism on the pricing, recovery 
rate and the profit. Ne Jia Jia (2015)[29] analysed the variation of the retailer’s recovery price, the profit and the 
total carbon emission in the case of having carbon emission constraints and having not carbon emission 
constraints. With symmetric information, Cheng Yong Wei et al.(2016)[30] established cooperation decision 
model for a mixed carbon policy of carbon trading-carbon tax (environmental tax) in a two-stage 𝑆-𝑀 supply 
chain. With symmetric information, Wang Wen Bin et al. (2016)[31] discussed the impact of the government’s 
reward and penalty mechanism on recycling remanufacturing decision.  
        The above literatures generally considered the government’s reward and penalty mechanism and carbon 
emission as “instrumental variables” in the reverse supply chain. Moreover, the research object in above 
literatures included one manufacturer and one retailer. The above literatures considered the impact of the 
government’s reward and penalty mechanism on the manufacturer or the retailer under the symmetric 
information conditions. On the other hand, this paper analysed the impact of the government’s reward and 
penalty mechanism on the reverse supply chain network under the asymmetric information conditions.  
3. Theory Model and Variable descriptions   
      3.1. Theory Model   
 
                 Fig.1. The structure of the reward-penalty mechanism for reverse supply chain network with asymmetric Information    
                                                    and retail-level competition in the presence of carbon emission constraints 
        In the Fig.1., we consider a single manufacturer (such as computers), two retailers (such as supermarkets), 
consumers, and government department supply chain network system components. The manufacturer sells 
product to two retailers. The retailer one recycles the WEEE products, the recycling rate expresses , and retailer 
two doesn’t recycle the WEEE products. The manufacturer buy-backs the WEEE products from the retailer one, the buy-
back price expresses 1w . The manufacturer produces new products by using the old material. The consumer purchases new 
products, the price can expresses 1p and 2p . 
        The retailer one’s fixed cost expresses 2I  , I can express the retailer one’s fixed cost, it includes recovery 
network construction funds, advertisement fees and so on, the recycling difficulty coefficient can express  . The 
recycling rate can increase with the increasing of the fixed cost. Assuming that the recycling difficulty coefficient, the 
recycling rate and the fixed cost are the retailer one’s private information, it also reflects the asymmetric information 
between one manufacturer and two retailers. Thus, the recycling difficulty coefficient, the recycling rate and the fixed cost of 
the retailer one’s can express ( H type ) including , , IH H H  , and ( L type ) including , , IL L L  . Manufacturer doesn't 
know retailer one’s real information about recycling rate, the fixed cost and the recycling difficulty coefficient, however, the 
manufacturer knows their distribution probability,    , 1L HP I P I    .In order to get more profit, the retailer one 
may provide  false information. Under the asymmetric information conditions, the manufacturer should design 
the identify contract so that the retailer one can make rational choice. 
      Assuming that the manufacturer is the channel leader of the reverse supply chain network, the retailer is the 
channel follower. The government should design the reward and penalty mechanism that the government should  
set the goal recycling rate and the carbon emission superior limitation. On the one hand, when the recycling rate 
is lower than the goal recovery rate, retailer one should be punished by the government, on the contrary, the 
retailer one can get reward. On the other hand, when the carbon emission is larger than the superior limitation, 
retailer one should be punished by the government, on the contrary, the retailer one can get reward. In this paper,  
under the asymmetric information conditions, the government provides the reward and penalty mechanism for 
the carbon emission and recovery rate,  when two retailers participate in competition activity,  discussing how 
the government should provide reward and penalty mechanism to promoting two retailers participating in the 
recycling activity. 
      3.2. Variable Descriptions   
     In this section, we introduce the meaning of some variables. The retailer one’s recycling difficulty coefficient 
 can express  , H and L are the high and low coefficient. The retailer one’s recycling rate expresses , H
and L  are the high and low recycling rate, which is the retailer one’s decision variable. The retailer one’s fixed 
cost can express I , HI and LI  are the high and low fixed cost. The unit testing and sorting cost of manufacturer can 
express dc .The unit remanufacturing cost of manufacturer can express rc .The manufacturer’s unit cost of new 
product express mc .The retailer one’s unit price of new product express 1p .The retailer two’s unit price of new 
product is 2p . The unit buy-back price of retailer one’s can express 1w .The market demand of retailer one’s can 
express 1q , 211 ppaq  , a is the potential market demand,  is the substitute coefficient, 10  . The 
market demand of retailer two’s can express 2q , 122 ppaq  . The goal recycling rate of the government 
can express 0 , when 0  , the retailer one can get some reward, and on the contrary, the retailer one can get 
some penalty. The manufacturer’s unit carbon emission can express me . The goal carbon emission superior 
limitation can express 0e , when the manufacturer’s carbon emission is larger than superior limitation, the 
manufacturer can get penalty, and on the contrary, the manufacturer can get reward. The government unit degree 
of reward and penalty mechanism for the retailer one can express f . The total quantity of the market demand 
can expressQ , 21 qqQ  . The government total degree of reward and penalty strength for the manufacturer 
can express M ,  0eQefM m  . The government unit degree of reward and penalty strength for the 
manufacturer can express k .       
4. The Decision-Making Model of the Reverse Supply Chain Network Based on the 
Reward and Penalty Mechanism of the Government under Asymmetric Information 
      Assuming that the recycling difficulty coefficient, the recycling rate and the fixed cost are the retailer one’s private 
information, it also reflects the asymmetric information between manufacturer and two retailers. The manufacturer should 
design the identify contract so that the retailer one can make rational choice. The manufacturer design two kinds 
of identify contracts, includes     , , ,H H L Lw w  . Based on the Principal-agent theory, the manufacturer 
should set the participation constraint and incentive constraint so that the retailer one can participate in the 
contract. Five stackelberg game models are built which are different in terms of the coordination structure of the 
reverse supply chain network and power structure of the reward-penalty mechanism: (1) the reverse supply 
chain network centralized decision-making model; (2) the reverse supply chain network centralized decision-
making model with carbon emission constraint; (3) the retailers’ competition reverse supply chain network 
decentralized  decision-making model; (4) the retailers’ competition reverse supply chain network decentralized 
decision-making model with carbon emission constraint; and (5) the retailers’ competition reverse supply chain 
network decentralized  decision-making model with  carbon emission constraint  and  the government’s reward-
penalty mechanism. We discuss the government reward and penalty mechanism design problems in the reverse 
supply chain network with asymmetric information and retail-level Competition in the presence of carbon 
emission constraints. 
      4.1 ModelⅠ: The reverse supply chain network centralized decision-making model 
       Firstly, we research the reverse supply chain network centralized decision-making model. In this case, in 
order to identify the true cost of the retailer one, we must use the above contract. In order to comparing with the  
decentralized decision-making model, assuming that there are one manufacturer and one retailer in the modelⅠ. 
The profit of the manufacturer can be expressed as follows:  
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      The profit of the retailer one can be expressed as follows: 
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      The total profit of the reverse supply chain network is that: 
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      The participation constraint and incentive constraint of the retailer one is that: 
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      In equation (4), 
0R
 is the lowest profit of the retailer one, the first two inequalities are the participation constraint, the 
after two inequalities are the incentive constraint.  
      The modelⅠcan be solved by using the Lagrange multiplier method. The optimal solution can express as follows: 
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      4.2 ModelⅡ:  The reverse supply chain network centralized decision-making model with carbon 
emission constraint  
       In this case, the government total degree of reward and penalty mechanism for the manufacturer is
 01 eeqfM m  , in this model, the decision-maker pursue the overall profit maximization. Assuming that there 
are one manufacturer and one retailer in the modelⅡ, the profit of the manufacturer can be expressed as follows:  
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      The profit of the retailer one can be expressed as follows: 
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        The total profit of the reverse supply chain is that:
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        The participation constraint and incentive constraint of the retailer one is that:
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      In equation (12), 
0R
 is the lowest profit of the retailer one, the first two inequalities is the participation constraint, the 
after two inequalities is the incentive constraint.  
      The modelⅡcan be solved by using the Lagrange multiplier method. The optimal solution can express as follows: 
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       4.3 Model Ⅲ:  the retailers’ competition reverse supply chain network decentralized decision-making 
model  
      In this case, the manufacturer is the channel leader in the Stackelberg game model, while, two retailers are 
the follower in the Stackelberg game model. The manufacturer commissioned the retailer one recycling the 
WEEE products. At the same time, there is competition relationship between two retailers. In model Ⅲ, the 
manufacturer and two retailers should consider their own maximize profit. The profit of the manufacturer can be 
expressed as follows: 
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       The participation and incentive constraint of the retailer one is that:
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  The retailer one is responsible for recycling the WEEE product, the decision variables are and 1p , the 
retailer one’s profit can be expressed as follows: 
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      The retailer two is not responsible for recycling the WEEE product, the decision variable is 2p , the retailer 
two’s profit can be expressed as follows: 
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     The decision order for the game model Ⅲ: Firstly, the manufacturer should decide the buy-back price  3
Hw  
and  3
Lw , then, the retailer one should decide the recovery rate 
 3
H and
 3
L ,lastly,  two retailers decide their 
prices  
1
3
R
p and  
2
3
R
p .  
      The model Ⅲ can be solved by using the Lagrange multiplier method. The optimal solution can express as follows: 
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      4.4 Model Ⅳ:  the retailers’ competition reverse supply chain network decentralized decision-making 
model with carbon emission constraint  
      In this case, the manufacturer is the channel leader in the Stackelberg game model, while, two retailers are 
the channel followers. The manufacturer commissioned the retailer one recycling the WEEE products. At the 
same time, there is competition relationship between two retailers’. The government total degree of reward and 
penalty strength to the manufacturer is  01 eeqfM m  , the profit of the manufacturer can be expressed as follows 
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      The participation and incentive constraint of the retailer one is that:
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   The retailer one’s profit can be expressed as follows: 
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        The retailer two’s profit can be expressed as follows: 
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      The model Ⅳ can be solved by using the Lagrange multiplier method. The optimal solution can express as 
follows: 
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       4.5 Model Ⅴ:  the retailers’ competition reverse supply chain network decentralized decision-making 
model with carbon emission constraint and the government’s reward-penalty mechanism           
       In this case, the government should give carbon emission constraints for the manufacturer, moreover, the 
government should give reward and penalty mechanism for the retailer one’s recycling rate. Thus, the retailer 
one can recycle more the WEEE products.  The total degree of the reward and penalty strength is  0rk   . 
The retailer two does not recycle the WEEE products, the retailer two can get penalty by the government, and 
the total degree of the penalty strength is 0k . The profit of the manufacturer can be expressed as follows: 
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     The participation and incentive constraint of the retailer one is that:
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    The retailer one’s profit can be expressed as follows: 
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        The retailer two’s profit can be expressed as follows: 
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        The model Ⅴcan be solved by using the Lagrange multiplier method. The optimal solution can express as 
follows:  
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5. Comparing the result in different decision-making game models  
       In this section, we mainly compare the result in different decision-making game models; we can get the 
following propositions: 
       Proposition 1. Comparing the modelⅠwith the modelⅡ: If    1m L H L Hfe        , thus
   2 1
0H Hw w  ; 
if 
   1m L H L Hfe        , thus
   2 1
0H Hw w  ；Because 0 mfe ,  if  0 HL  , thus
   2 1
- 0L Lw w  . 
       Proposition 1 suggests that the retailer one’s fixed cost is higher, if    1m L H L Hfe        , in other 
words, when the manufacturer’s carbon emission is smaller than the total degree of the reward and penalty 
strength, the buy-back price in the model Ⅱ is larger than that in the model Ⅰ .On the contrary, if 
   1m L H L Hfe        , in other words, when the manufacturer’s carbon emission is larger than the total 
 degree of the reward and penalty strength, the buy-back price in the modelⅡis smaller than that in the modelⅠ. 
The retailer one’s fixed cost is lower, the buy-back price in the modelⅡis lower than that in the modelⅠ. 
          Proposition 2 . Comparing the modelⅠwith the modelⅡ: If 0H , 0 mfe ,thus    
2 1
- 0H H  
;if 
0 mfe , 0 HL  ,thus    2 1- 0L L  
. 
        Proposition 2 suggests that no matter how high or low of the fixed cost in the retailer one, the recycling rate  
in the modelⅡis smaller than that in the modelⅠ. 
          Proposition 3 .  Comparing the model Ⅲ with the model Ⅳ: No matter how high or low of the fixed cost 
in the retailer one, if it satisfy the following condition ① 0m
L
e
e

 , ②    2 2 2 24
LH L L L H
c c           , 
the buy-back price in the model Ⅳis larger than that in the model Ⅲ. On the contrary, if it satisfy the following 
condition ① 0m
L
e
e

 , ②    2 2 2 24
LH L L L H
c c           , the buy-back price in the model Ⅳis 
smaller than that in the model Ⅲ. Proposition 3 suggest that the retailer one’s buy-back price decide on the 
manufacturer’s carbon emission me when the government implements the reward and penalty mechanism for the 
manufacturer’s carbon emission.  
         Proposition 4 .  Comparing the model Ⅳwith the model Ⅲ: If 0mH fe , 0 , 0H ,   02
2
  , 
thus    4 3- 0H H  
; If 
LH   0 ,when 04-
2  ,thus    4 3 0L L   ,when 04-
2  ,thus
   4 3
0L L   .  
       Proposition 4 suggest that the retailer one’s fixed cost is high, the recycling rate in the model Ⅳis larger 
than that in the model Ⅲ.When the retailer one’s fixed cost is low, if 04-2  , the recycling rate in the 
model Ⅳis larger than that in the model Ⅲ, if 04-
2  , the recycling rate in the model Ⅳis lower than 
that in the model Ⅲ. 
          Proposition 5 .   In the model Ⅳ, if 0mfe , 00 fe , 0a ,   0
2
 ccccp drmm ,thus, 
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R R
p p  ，
   
2 2
4 3
0
R R
p p  . Proposition 5 suggest that it can improve two retailer’s price that the government implement 
carbon emissions constraints for the manufacturer. 
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          Proposition 6. Comparing the model Ⅴwith the model Ⅳ: If the retailer one’s fixed cost is high, when it 
satisfy the following condition ①  0-4 22  LL c  ②  
2 2 24 -L Lc c    , the buy-back price in the model Ⅴ
is larger than that in the model Ⅳ.If the retailer one’s fixed cost is low, when if satisfy the following condition 
① 02--2 22  ② 0-4 22   LLL c , the buy-back price in the modelⅤis larger than that in the 
model Ⅳ. 
         Proposition 7.  Comparing the model Ⅴwith the model Ⅳ: If 0-8 2  , 0k ,   02 2   ,thus, 
   5 4
- 0H H  
. If 
2 4 0  
,
2 24k   
,thus 
   5 4
0L L   . If 
2 4 0  
, 2 24k    ,thus
   5 4
0L L   .  
         Proposition 7 suggest that the retailer one’s fixed cost is high, the recycling rate in the model Ⅴis larger 
than that in the model Ⅳ. The retailer one’s fixed cost is low, if it satisfies the condition 2 4 0    and 
2
24
k




, the recycling rate in the model Ⅴis larger than that in the model Ⅳ. On the contrary, if it satisfies 
the condition  2 4 0    and 
2
24
k




, the recycling rate in the model Ⅴis smaller than that in the model 
Ⅳ. 
        Proposition 8. Comparing the modelⅤwith the model Ⅳ: The retailer one’s price is that  
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the retailer two’s price is that  
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. Proposition 8 suggest that the two retailers’ 
price 1p  and 2p can be impacted by the k . No matter how large or low the fixed cost of the retailer one is, 
Only if the unit degree of the reward and penalty strength reaches certain level, the retailer’s price in the model 
Ⅴis lower than that in the model Ⅳ.On the contrary, the retailer’s price in the modelⅤis larger than that in the 
model Ⅳ. 
6. Numerical analysis 
       In above section, we analysis that with the asymmetric information, how does the participate-incentive 
contract design between the manufacturer and the retailer so that it can promote the retailer to recycling more 
WEEE products in different decision-making model?  How does the reward and penalty mechanism of the 
government impact on the recycling rate, the sell price and the profit in different decision-making model? 
Because the decision-making model is very complex in the model ⅣandⅤ, in this section, we analysis the 
impact of the government reward and penalty mechanism on the recycling rate, the buy-back price and the 
retailer’s price. The relevant parameter is set as follows: 
        4c , 0.7H  , 0.5L  , I 40H  , I 30L  , 3dc , 6.2rc , 2mc ,
7.11 p , 9.12 p , 3a ,
4.0 , 8.00  , 9.0me , 3.10 e , 3.1mp  ,  10,3f ,  8,2k . The decision result in the model ⅣandⅤ can 
be expressed in the table 1. 
                               Table 1 the decision result in the model Ⅳ andⅤ 
f  k  
*
4
MH
w  *
4
ML
w  *
4
RH
  *
4
RL
  *
5
MH
w  *
5
ML
w  *
5
RH
  *
5
RL
  
3 2 3.8 2.9 0.38 0.21 4.5 3.3 0.56 0.43 
5 4 4.0 3.2 0.42 0.24 5.3 3.7 0.63 0.47 
7 6 4.1 3.3 0.45 0.28 5.9 4.6 0.69 0.56 
9 8 4.3 3.5 0.49 0.32 6.8 5.5 0.78 0.63 
    We can get the following conclusions: 
       (1) When the retailer one’s fixed cost is high, in the modelⅤ, the buy-back price of the manufacturer’s can 
increase with the increasing of the degree of the reward and penalty strength, the range between 4 and 8. On the 
other hand, in the model Ⅳ, the buy-back price of the manufacturer’s can increase with the increasing of the 
degree of the reward and penalty strength, the range between 3 and 5.  When the retailer one’s fixed cost is low, 
in the model Ⅴ, the buy-back price of the manufacturer’s can increase with the increasing of the degree of the 
reward and penalty strength, the range between 3 and 6. On the other hand, in the model Ⅳ, the buy-back price 
of the manufacturer’s can increase with the increasing of the degree of the reward and penalty strength, the 
range between 3 and 4. This suggests that it can promote the increasing of the buy-back price by implementing 
the reward and penalty mechanism.    
       (2) When the retailer one’s fixed cost is high, in the modelⅤ, the recycling rate of the retailer one can 
increase with the increasing of the degree of the reward and penalty strength, the range between 0.5 and 0.8. On 
the other hand, in the model Ⅳ, the recycling rate of the retailer one can increase with the increasing of the 
degree of the reward and penalty strength, the range between 0.35 and 0.5.  When the retailer one’s fixed cost is 
low, in the model Ⅴ, the recycling rate of the retailer one can increase with the increasing of the degree of the 
reward and penalty strength, the range between 0.4 and 0.7. On the other hand, in the model Ⅳ, the recycling 
rate of the retailer one can increase with the increasing of the degree of the reward and penalty strength, the 
range between 0.2 and 0.35. This suggests that it can promote the increasing of the recycling rate by 
implementing the reward and penalty mechanism.    
7. Conclusion 
         In this paper, we discuss the government’s reward and penalty mechanism in the presence of asymmetric 
information and carbon emission constraint when downstream retailers compete in a reverse supply chain 
network. Considering five game models which are different in terms of the coordination structure of the reverse 
supply chain network and power structure of the reward-penalty mechanism: (1) the reverse supply chain 
network centralized decision-making model; (2) the reverse supply chain network centralized decision-making 
model with carbon emission constraint; (3) the retailers’ competition reverse supply chain network decentralized  
decision-making model; (4) the retailers’ competition reverse supply chain network decentralized  decision-
making model with carbon emission constraint; (5) the retailers’ competition reverse supply chain network 
decentralized  decision-making model with  carbon emission constraint  and  the government’s reward-penalty 
mechanism. Building the participation-incentive contract under each model use the principal-agent theory and 
solving the model use the Lagrange multiplier method. We can get the following conclusion: (1) when the 
government implements the reward-penalty mechanism for carbon emission and recycling simultaneously, the 
recycling rate as well as the buy-back price offered by the manufacturer are higher than those when the 
government conducts reward-penalty mechanism exclusively for carbon emission; (2) when the government 
implements carbon emission constraint，both retailers’ selling prices of the new product are  higher than  those 
when no carbon emission constraint is forced; (3) there is no certain relationship between the two retailers’ 
selling prices of the new product when the government implements the reward-penalty mechanism only for 
carbon emission and when it implements the mechanism for carbon emission as well as recycling; (4) 
Regardless of the retailer's fixed cost is high or low, when the government implement reward-penalty 
mechanism for carbon emission, the retailer's buy-back price is affected by the carbon emission in the 
manufacturer; (5) When it satisfy certain some conditions, the buy-back price of the retailers’ competition 
reverse supply chain decentralized  decision-making model with  carbon emission constraint  and  the 
government’s reward-penalty mechanism can larger than that of the retailers’ competition reverse supply chain 
decentralized  decision-making model with carbon emission constraint. 
           In this paper, we discuss the government’s reward and penalty mechanism in the presence of asymmetric 
information and carbon emission constraint when downstream retailers compete in a reverse supply chain 
network. However, dual asymmetric information can’t be considered in this paper. In the future, we should 
consider the government’s reward and penalty mechanism in the presence of dual asymmetric information and 
carbon emission constraint when downstream retailers compete in a reverse supply chain network. Moreover, 
we can discuss the government’s reward and penalty mechanism in the presence of asymmetric information and 
carbon emission constraint when the manufacturers compete in reverse supply chain network. 
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